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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent INTERMOUNTAIN STOCK EXCHAnGE ("INTER.MOUNTAIN")
regained possession of the basement of the Intermountain Stock
Exchange Building in Salt Lake City after an unlawful detainer
action, and UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT ("UTE-CAL") and PETER J. BUFFO
("BUFFO") appealed.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable James S. Sawaya, in the Third District Court
of Salt Lake County, Utah, heard the case without a jury on
March 6th and 7th, 1980.

After service of a Notice to Quit

on December 12, 1979, appellant BUFFO filed a declaratory
judgment action on December 31, 1979 seeking to establish the
existence of a lease.

The lower court granted accelerated con-

sideration of respondent INTERMOUNTAIN's W1lawful detainer
counterclaim.

Judge Sawaya found that appellant BUFFO had neither

assumed a prior, terminated lease for the same premises nor
negotiated a new lease with respondent INTERMOUNTAIN.

The

Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment (Unlawful Detainer) held that appellant BUFFO's month-tomonth tenancy had been properly terminated when he was duly
served with Notice to Quit under Utah's Unlawful Detainer
Statutes, 78-36-1 through 78-36-11 U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
The lower court granted respondent INTERMOUNTAIN immediate
possession of the prett.ises and awarded the statutory treble
damages for the period of appellant BUFFO's unlawful detainer
from January 1, 1980, until appellant BUFFO vacated the
prei
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant BUFFO filed a Notice of Appeal on May 5,
1980, seeking a reversal of the April 3, 1980 Judgment that
he was unlawfully detaining respondent INTERMOUNTAIN's premises
after January 1, 1980.
of the premises.

Appellant BUFFO does not seek repossession

Rather, appellant BUFFO hopes to overturn the

award of statutory treble damages in the amount of $13,688.00 (R. 234)
made to the respondent INTERMOUNTAIN by Judge Sawaya.
If the lower court's determination of the unlawful
detainer issues is upheld, appellant PETE J. BUFFO seeks declaration from this Court that he is not personally liable for
damages awarded and already paid.

Alternatively, appellant

BUFFO seeks reduction in the damages awarded by the trial court.
Respondent INTERMOUNTAIN respectfully requests this
Court to affirm the Judgment of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rule 75(p) (2) (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that the appellant•s brief contain "a concise statement
of the material facts of the case citing the pages of the record
supporting such statement."

However, appellant does not once

cite the Record in his Statement of Facts.
The Statement of Facts in appellant BUFFO's Brie£
is controverted by respondent INTERMOUNTAIN with references
to the pages of the Transcript on Appeal and the Exhibits.
Appellant BUFFO has failed to refer to the lower court's Findings
of Fact and supporting Transcript on Appeal and Exhibits
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

/

necessary for the resolution of this dispute.

Although appel-

lant BUFFO's Brief attacks Judge Sawaya's Findings of Fact,
there are no citations to the testimony at trial.

Instead,

there are inappropriate citations to the depositions of witnesses who appeared at the two-day trial.

such misstatements,

omissions and detailed citations to BUFFO's deposition are
puzzling, for appellant BUFFO apparently objects to only one
aspect of the lower court's decision - the

provision for treble

damages.
On August 1, 1976, INTERMOUNTAIN leased a portion
of the basement of its Exchange Building, at 39 Exchange Place,
Salt Lake City, Utah, to Investestate, Inc., ("INVESTESTATE"),
a publicly held Utah corporation (R. 332, Defendant's Exhibit
No. 1, R. 390-1).

INVESTESTATE operated a private club on

the premises (R. 332).
The INVESTESTATE lease was to run for a period of
two years - from August l, 1976, to July 31, 1978 (Defendant's
Exhibit No. 1, Article II, Section 1).

The lease specifically

provided that INVESTESTATE could not assign the lease without
"the express written consent of the Landlord (INTERMOUNTAIN)"
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, Article VI, Section 4).

The lease

also provided that INVESTESTATE had an option to extend the
initial term for an additional five-year term by giving written
notice to INTERMOUNTAIN of its intent to do so at least six
months prior to the expiration of the original term {Defendant's
Exhibit No. 1, Article XVII).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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INVESTESTATE was unable to operate profitably and
was forced to breach its lease in 1977 (R. 441, also admitted
by appellant BUFFO at Page 3 of Appellant's Brief).

In October

of 1977, INTERMOUNTAIN terminated INVESTESTATE's lease for
failure to pay rent (Trial Court•s Findings of Fact No. 4;
Defendant's Exhibit No. 2; R. 333; R. 392).

INVESTESTATE was

allowed to remain as a month-to-month tenant until it abandoned
the premises in May of 1978.
No. 4; R. 225-26; R. 334).

(Trial Court's Findings of Fact
As of the date of INVESTESTATE's

abandonment, over $2,000 was past due as rent.
Exhibit No. 2).

(Defendant's

This: amount· was: reduced to judgment against

INVESTESTATE in November, 1978 (R. 395).

That amount was never

paid to the landlord INTERMOUNTAIN either by INVESTESTATE
(R. 395) or by BUFFO (R. 348) though BUFFO admits he promised
to pay that judgment amount (R. 464-465) •
During the first week of June, 1978, appellant BUFFO
took possession of the abandoned premises without the prior
consent or knowledge of INTERMOUNTAIN.
of Fact No. 6; R. 226; R. 335-336).

(Trial Court's Findings

Appellant BUFFO informed

INTER.MOUNTAIN, through its President, Reo Cutler, that he,
BUFFO,

had taken over the premises from INVESTESTATE and that

he wished to negotiate a lease agreement with INTERMOUNTAIN
for the premises.
R. 226; R. 335-6).

(Trial Court's Findings of Fact No. 6;
BUFFO stated expressly that "I told Mr.

Cutler that in reference to the existing lease that was presently
on the property, there was no use discussing it, because if
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(

there was a problem on it, I was not going to buy a lawsuit"
(R. 445).

Reo Cutler, as President of INTERMOUNTAIN confirmed

with BUFFO that a new lease would be necessary since the INVESTESTATE lease had been terminated in October of 1977.
court's Findings of Fact No. 7; R. 226; R. 335-6).
dence and proposed lease agreements were exchanged.

(Trial
correspon(Trial

Court's Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9, and 11; R. 226-27; Defendant's
Exhibits No. 3, 4 and 5).

The essential terms proposed by

each of the parties were in substantial conflict.

(Defendant's

Exhibit No. 8; Trial Court's Conclusion of Law No. 2; R. 228-29;
R. 385-6; R. 400; R. 452).

No agreement on the terms was ever

reached and hence no lease was ever executed between INTERMOUNTAIN
and UTE-CAL or BUFFO.

(Trial Court's Findings of Fact No. 11;

R. 227; Trial Court's Conclusion of Law No. 2; R. 228-29; R.
339-341).
Neither appellant BUFFO, UTE-CAL nor any other entity
controlled by the felon PETE J. BUFFO made timely rent payments
for the first three months BUFFO occupied the basement of the
Intermountain Stock Exchange Building - June, July, and August
of 1978.
477).

(Trial court's Findings of Fact No. 12; R. 227; R.
When BUFFO finally sent a check for past due rent on.

August 3, 1978, the check bounced.

(R. 343).

Following the return

of BUFFO's rent check for insufficient funds, Reo Cutler, the
President of INTERMOUNTAIN, had a telephone conversation with
• Buffo.

(R. 332; 343).

During this telephone conversation,

• cutler told "Mr. Buffo in August of 1978 that there would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be no further negotiation regarding the lease."

(R. 344).

This conversation implemented the decision of the Board of
Trustees of INTERMOUNTAIN that they " • • • were just not interested in discussing the lease further until we (INTERMOUNTAIN)
found out whether he (BUFFO) was going to pay his bills."

(R.

344).

The brother-in-law of PETE J. BUFFO, Dr. Silvio Fasio,
who originally introduced BUFFO to INTERMOUNTAIN, was a member
of the Board of Governors of the Intermountain Stock Exchange
when this decision to terminate lease negotiations was taken.
(R. 487-8).
During the next nine months, BUFFO defaulted repeatedly
on the rental payments due INTERMOUNTAIN on the month-to-month
tenancy.

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 6).

BUFFO was served with

a Notice to Quit or Pay Rent on three separate occasions.

(Trial

Court's Findings of Fact No. 14; R. 228; Defendant's Exhibits
22, 23 and 24).

BUFFO admits receipt of these notices pursuant

to the Unlawful Detainer Statutes.

(R. 462; 471).

In August, 1979, INTERMOUNTAIN accepted an offer from
co-respondent Exchange Associates to purchase the Intermountain
Stock Exchange Building.

(Findings of Fact No. 15; R. 228).

The purchase was completed on October 15, 1979.

(R. 372).

After the purchase, Exchange Associates attempted to negotiate
a lease of the basement premises with BUFFO and UTE-CAL.
ings of Fact No. 15; R. 228; R. 372-376).

(Find-

Like INTERMOUNTAIN,

Exchange Associates were unable to agree upon terms with BUFFO.
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(Findings of Fact No. 15; R. 228; R. 377).

Draft leases were

prepared by Exchange Associates but never signed or accepted
by BUFFO.

(R. 376-7).
Exchange Associates served a Notice to Quit the

premises on December 12, 1979.
R. 378; R. 482).

(Findings of Fact No. 16; R. 228;

The December 11, 1979 Notice to Quit was

served by Deputy Constable R. J. Reitz (Defendant's Exhibit No.
20).

The Notice was personally delivered to the Manager of the

private club BUFFO operated in the basement of the Intermountain
Stock Exchange Building.

(R. 482; Defendant's Exhibit No. 20).

A copy was posted in the door of the premises.

(R. 482; Defendant's

Exhibit No. 20).

A copy was mailed to BUFFO.

(Defendant's

Exhibit No. 20).

A copy was delivered to counsel to BUFFO,

Robert M. McRae and Loni F. DeLand, who had accepted notice
before, apparently on behalf of BUFFO.
I.

(R. 482).

APPELLANT BUFFO'S NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM THE
UNLAWFUL DETAINER JUDGMENT WAS NOT FILED
WITHIN TEN DAYS, AS REQUIRED BY 78-36-11,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
The jurisdictional question presented in this case

is whether Notice of Appeal filed on May 5, 1980, challenging
an unlawful detainer judgment entered on April 3, 1980, was
timely filed.

If the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed,

this Court should dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
on June 30, 1980, respondent INTERMOUNTAIN raised this
jurisdiction question by filing a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal
pursuant to Rule 73B(a) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

On

August 11, 1980, this Court deferred its ruling on the Motion and
the S.J. Quinneyto
Law Library.
Funding forthe
digitization
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Library Services
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Respondent INTERMOUNTAIN's position is:

On April 3,

1980, Judge Sawaya signed the Judgment entitled "Unlawful Detainer."

(R. 233).

April 3, 1980.

The Judgment was entered later that day,

(R. 233).

On April 11, 1980, appellant BUFFO

filed an "Objection to Judgment."

(R. 238).

Such a pleading

is not authorized by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

This

Court has held that such unauthorized pleadings are "abortive
under the Rules."

Utah State· Emp·loy·ee's Credit Union v. Riding,

24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d 1 (1970).

Thus, the pleading is without

effect and did not act to stay the ten-day appeal period provided
in Section 78-36-11.

Even if this pleading had stayed the ten-

day period, Judge Sawaya affirmed the April 3, 1980 Judgment
on April 23, 1980.

So the ten-day appeal period would have run

in any event on April 26, 1980.

On May 5, 1980, thirty-two days

after the unlawful detainer Judgment was entered, appellant BUFFO
filed a Notice of Appeal.

(R. 280-1).

Section 78-36-11 spec-

ifically requires that an appeal from an unlawful detainer judgment must be taken within ten days:

"Either party may, within

ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered."

This shorter

period for filing a Notice of Appeal implements the policy of
the Unlawful Detainer Statute in Utah of accelerated resolution
of disputed possession of real property.

Since the ten-day appeal

period had expired on April 14, 1980, (three weeks before BUFFO's
appeal was filed}, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear
the instant appeal, and it should be dismissed.
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I,

A.

The Shorter Ten-Day Appeal Period Provided in
78-36-11, Utah Code Annotated, Rather Than The
General One Month Appeal Period Provided in
Rule 73(a) I Utah Rules of civil Procedure
Contr·o1s i'n This Case.
BUFFO appealed from Judge Sawaya's April 3, 1980 un-

lawful Detainer Judgment on May 5, 1980.

(R. 280-1).

BUFFO

must argue that the appeals procedure in the instant case is
governed by Rule 73(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for a one month period within which to file a Notice
of Appeal.

BUFFO's argument fails because Rule 73(a) creates

a one-month period for appeal "unless a shorter time is provided
by law."

Section 78-36-11 unquestionably establishes such a

"shorter time" in unlawful detainer cases.
statute provides that:

Specifically, the

"(e)ither party may, within ten days,

appeal from the judgment rendered." (emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently applied the
ten-day limitation to unlawful detainer actions rather than the
general one month provision for other appeals.
Harris, 37 Utah 226, 109 P. 1 (1910).

Hunsaker v.

In Madsen v. Chournos,

102 Utah 247, 129 P.2d 986 (1942), a landlord successfully brought
an unlawful detainer action against her tenant.

The landlord

moved to dismiss the tenant's appeal "on the ground that the
action is an unlawful detainer proceeding and that the appeal
• • • was not taken within ten days as required by Section
104-60-14, R.s.u., 1933" (at 986).
to Section 78-36-11, U.C.A., 1953).

(the predecessor statute
This Court dismissed the

appeal a£ter Madsen, holding that the appeal "should have been
Sponsored bythe
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Quinney Law Library.
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recent case of Coombs v. ·J·ohnson, 26 Utah 2d 8, 484 P. 2d 155
(1971), this Court acknowledged that Section 78-36-11 specified
a ten-day period in which to file for appeal for an unlawful

.

detainer judgment.

Since the tenant in· Coombs had not appealed

within ten days, its appeal was dismissed by this Court.
Appellant BUFFO could argue that the one month limit
should apply because Judge Sawaya's Findings of Fact supporting
the unlawful detainer Judgment reflect upon other issues, such
as the existence of an alleged underlying lease.

The Utah

Supreme Court has explicitly rejected such an argument in a case
remarkably similar to the instant case.

In· Brandley v.· Lewis,

97 Utah 217, 92 P.2d 338 (1939), a landlord obtained an unlawful
detainer judgment.

The tenant appealed, but not within ten days.

When respondent/landlord filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal,
appellant argued that the ten-day period was not the applicable
limitation period.

Appellant tenant in Brandley reasoned that

because the unlawful detainer judgment necessitated an interpretation of underlying lease terms, the judgment involved issues
other than unlawful detainer.

The Supreme Court rejected the

tenant's argument:
To determine therefore whether defendant was in
unlawful detainer the Court must determine the
meaning and effect of the [lease terms] , but that
does not change the action from one in unlawful
detainer. It is merely deciding a question the
decision of which is necessary in making a
determination as to whether defendant is in unlawful detainer.
(at 339-340).
The Utah Supreme Court found that the ten-day limitation was
applicable
and dismissed the appeal.
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Judge Sawaya's Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and the resulting Unlawful Detainer Judgment
considered in light of the rule of Brandley establish that BUFFO's
appeal procedure was gove~ned by 78-36-11 (ten days) rather than
Rule 73(a)

(one month).
Appellant BUFFO could also argue that the Utah Supreme

Court has not used the ten-day limitation period when the unlawful
detainer judgment was coupled with a judgment for counterclaim
liability or a declaratory judgment.

Ottenheimer v. Mountain

States Supply Co., 56 Utah 190, 188 P. 1117 (1920); Dunbar v.
Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P. 982 (1926).

Of course, there is

no such separate count in the case at bar:

the unlawful detainer

issues were severed from the plaintiff BUFFO's action for declaratory judgment by the trial court.

Judge Sawaya's Memorandum

Decision clearly establishes that the Judgment focused on unlawful detainer.
statement:

Judge Sawaya's decision was prefaced by the

"On the issue of unlawful detainer, the Court finds

from a preponderance of greater weight of the evidence as follows
" (R. 203).

Furthermore, the Judgment of April 3, 1980,

is entitled "Judgment (Unlawful Detainer)".

(R. 233-4).

Since

the Wllawful detainer judgment stands by itself, the ten-day
limitation of 78-36-11, Utah Code Annotated controls.
B.

Failure to Timely File· a Notice of Appeal is a
Jurisdicti·on·al ne·f·ect Requiring this -Court to
Dismiss Buffo's Appeal.
Utah and the federal courts follow the firmly held

rule that a Notice of Appeal must be timely filed or the appellate
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court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

This Court

has upheld this requirement that a Notice of Appeal

~

be timely

filed even when presented with assertions of substantial prejudice
to the appellant or inadvertence or incompetence of counsel.
Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955); Galanis
v. Moyes, 16 Utah 2d 181, 397 P.2d 988 (1965); Estate of Ratliff
v. Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967) f ·1n re Lynch's
Estate, 123 Utah 57, 254 P.2d 454 (1953).
Section 78-36-11, Utah Code Annotated, provides:
"Either party may, w"ithi·n ten days, appeal from the judgment
rendered."

The Utah Supreme Court has strictly enforced the

ten-day limitation period.

In Coombs v. ·Johnson, 26 Utah 2d

8, 484 P.2d 155 (1971), an appellant filed a Notice of Appeal
from a July 1 judgment on July 15.

The court held that the

appeal was not timely, and that therefore the Supreme Court
was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
for a unanimous Court, stated:

Justice Tuckett,

"It is apparent that the appeal

was not taken within the time prescribed by Section 78-36-11,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and this Court is without jurisdiction
to entertain it." (at 155).
In a more recent case, Fernandez v. Purdue, 30 Utah
2d 389, 518 P.2d 684 (1974), an unlawful detainer jud910-ent was
entered on April 3, 1973, and defendants filed their Notice of
Appeal from that judgment on April 30, 1973.
Callister held that:

Chief Justice

"This appeal was not taken within ten days,

the time provided in Section 78-36-11, Utah Code Annotated,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
;I

1953.

This Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the instant

appeal. n (at 685) •
. In another recent case, Vickery v. Kaiser, 556 P.2d
502 (1976), a tenant appealed from an unlawful detainer judgment.

This Court observed that the unlawful detainer statutes (and
specifically 78-36-11) require that "an appeal must be taken
within ten days from the judgment rendered" (emphasis added)
(at 503). Justice Elliott, for a unanimous court, held that "the
appeal in this matter was not taken within ten days after judgment • • • thus, this Court did not acquire jurisdiction to
determine the matters." (at 503).
In the instant case, the Clerk of the Court entered
Judge Sawaya's Unlawful Detainer Judgment in the Register of
Actions on the 3rd day of April, 1980. (R. 233).
filed his Notice of Appeal on May 5, 1980.

Appellant BUFFO

(R. 280-1).

The

Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal since i t was
not filed "within ten days", the time provided in Section 78-36-11.
C.

Filing an Unauthorized "Objection to Judgment" Does
Not Toll the Ten-Day Limitation . Period For Filing
a Notice of Appeal in an Unlawful Detainer Action
Appellant BUFFO may argue that the appeal period did

not end on April 14, ten days after the April 3, 1980 date of entry
of the Judgment, because he filed an "Objection to Judgment" on
April 11, 1980.

(R. 238-9).

There is no such pleading or document

entitled "Objection to Judgment" authorized or permitted by either
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or the Forcible Entry and

Detainer statutes.

Such a docmnent could not terminate or stay

the running
of the time for appeal.
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Appellant BUFFO may try to argue that the "Objection
to Judgment" was a motion made pursuant to Rules 50, 52, or 59,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, even though none of those rules
or the relief authorized pursuant to them was mentioned in the
Objection to Judgment.

Motions filed pursuant to Rules 50, 52

and 59 are, of course, the only means for tolling the time for
appeal provided in Rule 73.
There are two reasons why this potential argument by
appellant BUFFO should be rejected.

First, to appeal a judgment

entered in a forcible entry and detainer action, the appellant
must appeal pursuant to Section 78-36-11, not Rule 73.

Section

78-36-11 does not contain provisions analogous to Rules 50, 52
or 59.

Instead, in consonance with the other accelerated pro-

cedures authorized to obtain repossession of real property unlawfully held, the only remedy from an adverse judgment is an appeal
within ten days.

BUFFO did not do that and cannot now be heard

to argue that his inartful attempt to file a post-judgment motion,
pursuant to the inapplicable Rule 73, stayed the time for filing
an appeal under the proper statute, Section 78-36-11.
Second, this Court has recently held that the pattern
of regularity of procedure provided by the Rules of Civil Prostions presented and the finality of actions.
607 P.2d 841 {Utah 1980), the

In Peay v. Peay,

defendant filed an unauthorized

"Motion for Reconsideration of Order Striking Petition and Motion
for Relief from Final Judgment."

Justice Hall stated:

"It is

important to note in this regard that a party cannot extend the
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time for filing an appeal by simply filing a 'Motion for Reconsideration of Order Striking Petition and Motion for Relief
from Final Judgment.'" (at 843)
BUFFO's unauthorized pleading is rendered ineffective
by the rule announced in Utah State Employees' Credit Union

!!. Riding, 24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d l (1970):
Under the record here, we are unaware of any such
motion under our rules • • • • We think the motion to
reconsider the motion to vacate the judgment is
abortive under the rules • • • . We conclude that the
judgment of foreclosure, unappealed from, must stand
absent any timely appeal. (at 3)
The.Rules of Civil Procedure were carefully prepared
to assure a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."

(Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).

must be followed.

But the rules

Respondent INTERMOUNTAIN should not be forced

to speculate as to the true or intended nature of appellant
BUFFO's pleadings.

The Supreme Court observed this principle

in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966): "
the

new rules of procedure • • • were designed to provide

a pattern of regularity of procedure which the parties and the
courts could follow and rely upon • • • • " (at 663).
The reasoning in Peay, Riding and Drury is sound
and controlling in the instant case.

Appellant BUFFO's Ob-

jection to Judgment is "abortive under the rules" and therefore
did not stay the time for filing the Notice of Appeal.
Finally, even if the Objection to Judgment did toll
the ten-day limitations period (as appellant BUFFO may contend),
the May

s,

1980 Notice of Appeal still was not timely filed.
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After Judgment was entered on April 3, 1980, BUFFO filed his
Objection to Judgment on April 11, 1980.

The limitation period

was running for that interval (eight days).

If the Objection

to Judgment did indeed toll the ten-day period on April 11,
1980, it tolled that period only until April 23, 1980, (R. 254)
when BUFFO's Objection was rejected by Judge Sawaya and Unlawful
Detainer Judgment was reaffirmed.

Another twelve days expired

before the Notice of Appeal was filed.

Thus, even if the

limitation period were tolled during the consideration of the
Objection to Judgment, the Notice of Appeal was not filed until
May 5, 1980 - well after the expiration 0£ the ten-day period.
II.

THERE WAS NO VALID ASSIGNMENT OF INVESTESTATE'S
LEASE TO UTE-CAL. ·
Appellant BUFFO proposes two ·theories to establish

the existence of a valid lease between UTE-CAL and PETE J.
BUFFO, as tenant, and INTERMOUNTAIN, as landlord.

The first

theory argues that the INVESTESTATE-Stan Adams lease of August 1,
1976, was effectively assigned to UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO.

(Appellant BUFFO's Brief at 6).

The purported assignment is

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 31).
A.

INVESTESTATE's Lease Was Terminated on October 13,
1977.
The trial court found that INVESTESTATE's lease was

terminated on October 13, 1977 (Trial Court's Findings of Fact
No. 4; R. 225-26; R. 335), long before the attempted assignment
to UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO in May of 1978.

(R. 439-440).

The October 13, 1977 Notice of Termination of the INVESTESTATEStan Adams lease was admitted into evidence at trial as Defendant's
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had been terminated on October 13, 1977, the trial court properly
concluded, as a matter of law, that no valid assignment of
the lease could have occurred.

(Conclusions of Law No. l; R. 228).

Appellant BUFFO cannot cite to any evidence in the Record to
contradict the trial court's Findings of Fact No. 4 (R. 225)
that the INVESTESTATE-Stan Adams lease was validly terminated
in October, 1977, over six months before the purported assignment to UTE-CAL and BUFFO.

This finding of the trial court

should therefore be sustained as there is no contradicting
evidence much less evidence which preponderates against the
trial court's Findings of Fact.

Elton v. Utah State Retirement

Board, 28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (1972).
B.

Even if The LOwer court's Finding of the October '13,
1977, Terminatio·n· is· Ove·rturned, No Valid Assignment
of the INVESTESTATE Lease· Could Have Occurr·ed.
The purported assignment of the INVESTESTATE-Stan Adams

lease to UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO was invalid because it violated
the express terms of the lease.
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 31).

(Dee£endant's Exhibit No. 1,

Article VI, Section 4, of the

lease precludes any assignment without the express written
consent of the landlord, INTERMOUNTAIN.
No. 1).

(Defendant's Exhibit

The record shows that INTERMOUNTAIN never gave such

consent.
otherwise.

(R. 335), and appellant BUFFO has not attempted to prove
Consequently, the May 1978 purported assignment

by INVESTESTATE-Stan Adams to UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO is
in violation of the terms of the previously cancelled lease
between INTERMOUNTAIN as landlord and INVESTESTATE-Stan Adams
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as INVESTESTATE had none to transfer.

C.

Even if· the TNVES'TESTA"TE Le·a·s·e· wa·s· Not "Terminated
on· Octobe·r 13" I. -f977· I. Tt Exp':Lr·ea By Its• Own: 'Te'rtnS
·o·n ·July ·3-i-, · "1"9 7 8 •
The INVESTESTATE lease provided for a two-year term that

ended on July 31, 1978 (Article II of Defendant's Exhibit No.
1).

The tenant (INVESTESTATE-Stan Admas) could have extended

the lease for an additional five years by 9ivin9 written notice
to the landlord INTERMOUNTAIN at least six months prior to the
expiration of the lease (Article XVII of Defendant's Exhibit
No. 1).

However, the President of INVESTESTATE, Stan Adams,

stated unequivocally at trial that he did not "exercise the
option to extend that lease."

(R. 391).

An option to renew a lease must be exercised by the
tenant in order to effectuate the renewal. · Aiken v. Less
Taylor Motor· Co., 171 P.2d 676 (Utah 1946).

In Utah, the notice

to exercise a tenant's right to extend a lease must conform
to the precise terms required by the lease agreement.
Furniture

&

·I .X.L.

Carpet Insta1lation· Hou·se v. Berets et al., 91 P.

279 (Utah 1907).

If the renewal option terms are not complied

with, equity cannot intervene to protect the tenant from its
own failure to give the required notice of its option to renew
the lease.

Host International Inc. v. Summa Corp., 583 P.2d

1080 (Nev. 1978).
INTERMOUNTAIN, of course, never received any written
notice of intent -to extend the lease from INVESTESTATE as none
was ever sent.

(R. 391).

UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO could not

have extended the INVESTESTATE-Stan Adams lease because notice
to landlord INTERMOUNTAIN had to be given at least six months
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prior to the expiration of the lease.
No. 1).

(Defendant's Exhibit

The lease expired on July 31, 1978, and therefore any

notice of intent to extend would have to have occurred by
January 30, 1978.

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1).

However, it

was not until May, 1978, four months after the notice date,
that UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO attempted an assumption of the
lease.

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, R. 439-440, Appellant BUFFO's

Brief, Page 3).

Consequently, the final date for extending

the lease had expired before UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO even
attempted to extend the original term of the INVESTESTATE-Stan
Adams lease.

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, Appellant BUFFO's

Brief, Page 7).

Therefore, even if the lease continued in

existence after the October 13, 1977 Notice of Termination
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 2) the lease expired by its own terms
on July 31, 1978 and could not have been extended in May, 1978.
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1).
III.

INTERMOUNTAIN AS LANDLORD AND UTE-CAL AND PETE J.
BUFFO AS TENANT NEVER AGREED UPON LEASE TERMS.
Appellant BUFFO's second theory is that a valid lease

was created by a set of negotiations which occurred between
INTERMOUNTAIN and UTE-CAL from June to August, 1978.
Appellant BUFFO does not argue that a written lease
agreement exists.

The testimony of INTERMOUNTAIN's President,

Reo Cutler, (R. 348, 353) and that of PETE J. BUFFO (R. 459)
confirm that there never was a written lease agreement acceptable
to and signed by both parties.

The absence of any written

agreement between the parties creates a fatal statute of fraud
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problem for the appellant BUFFO:

Utah law provides that any

lease for a term longer than one year is unenforceable unless
reduced to a signed writing.

Section 25-5-3, U.C.A.

Further-

more, the trial court found, based upon two days of testimony
by eleven witnesses and thirty-one exhibits, that no recognized
exception to the statute of frauds had been established by
UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO.

(Trial Court Conclusion of Law No. 4;

R. 229).

Appellant BUFFO must argue that the statute of frauds
does not bar his claims.

Appellant BUFFO addresses the issue

of whether an exception to the statute of frauds applies,
(Appellant BUFFO's Brief at Page 8) but, in so doing, appellant
BUFFO has overlooked a prior question.

Before the statute of

frauds becomes relevant, appellant must establish that there
was in fact, a contract, which was not reduced to a signed
writing.

BUFFO, at trial, could not establish the existence

of an underlying contract.

The parties were far apart on all

terms, including rent, term and the consequences of a sale of
the building.

(Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 5, 8 and 16; R. 453)

Since there was no contract, or meeting of the minds, the Court
needn't address the question of whether it should be in writing.
Skeen v. Van· Sickle, 15 P.2d 344 (Utah 1932).

In Skeen, the

heirs of a landowner alleged the existence of a contract wherein·
the landowner had agreed that her land would revert to all her
heirs as tenants in conunon.
of frauds as a defense.

The defendants raised the statute

The court found that the statute of
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frauds was irrelevant because the plaintiffs had failed to prove
the extence of the underlying contract:

•The finding of no

contract at all eliminates any question as to a requirement
that it should be in writing • • • • • (at 346).
A.

There Was No Unde·r·lying· 'Contra·ct Which Would
Make The Statute oCFrauds a· Relevant Consideration.
The trial court reached the legal conclusion that no

written lease was signed by the parties (Trial Court Conclusion
of Law No. l; R. 228; R. 352-3).

No signed lease was offered

at trial and both INTERMOUNTAIN's President (R. 348, 397 and 399)
and PETE J. BUFFO confirmed that no such lease was ever signed.
(R. 459).

Consequently, the appellants claim to find the

requisite underlying contract in the unsigned, draft agreement
which UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO's counsel, Loni F. DeLand sent
to INTERMOUNTAIN's counsel, Jon
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 5).

c.

Heaton on August 1, 1978.

Appellant BUFFO now asks that

this "negotiated lease" be enforced as an exception to the
statute of frauds (Appellant's Brief, Page 8).
The August 1, 1978 proposed lease was prepared by
counsel to UTE-CAL and PETE J. BUFFO, (R. 384-386, 452) but
it cannot be construed as the necessary underlying contract.
The trial court found that INTERMOUNTAIN rejected, in writing,
the terms of that proposed lease and sent a counterproposal
to BUFFO's counsel.
R. 384-6).

(Findings of Fact No. 11; R. 227; R. 345-6;

Neither party's proposal was accepted by the other

party (Court's Findings of Fact No. 11; R. 227, R. 346, 348,
459).

Since the parties' proposals differed substantially
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(Defendant's Exhibit No. 8) no meeting of the minds has occurred
(Trial Court's Conclusion of Law No.

21

R. 228-29).

Since no contract was ever agreed upon by the parties,
the Court need not address the question of whether the contract
had to be in writing.

The statute of frauds simply doesn't

apply.
B. · Even If a con·tr·act Exi·ste·d', It Ts· Within The Statute
of Frauds To Which Tfie·r·e Ts No Applicable Ex·ception.
If any contract existed, as appellant BUFFO argues,
it was a lease for a period of longer than one year and, thus,
within the statute of frauds, Section 25-5-3, u.c.A.

The trial

court reached the legal conclusion that "UTE-CAL and/or BUFFO have
failed to establish any recognized exception to the statute of
frauds" (Conclusion of Law No. 4; R. 229).

In an attempt to have

this Court overturn that decision, appellant BUFFO argues that
the parties' actions might establish three exceptions to the statute
of frauds:

part performance, equitable estoppel, or waiver. The

decisions of this Court, however, hold that none of these possible
exceptions is applicable to the facts of the instant case.
1.

Part ·Performa·nce.

In· Ravarino v. Price, 2 6 O P. 2d

570 (Utah 1953), this Court recognized the "part performance"
exception to the statute of frauds.

The Court outlined the

circumstances under which part performance would obtain: acts
will constitute sufficient part performance if they are clearly
referable to some contract existing between the parties, if they
relate to the subject matter in dispute and as a result of these
acts, the plaintiff has been defrauded.

Such circumstances are

notSponsored
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in the case at bar: appellant BUFFO has failed to
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prove the existence of any underlying contract, (Trial court's
lindings of Fact No. 11; R. 227; Defendant's Exhibit No. 8) and
no fraud has been alleged by either party.

To establish the part

perfonnance exception to the statute of frauds, BUFFO and/or
UTE-CAL would have had to demonstrate that their part performance

claim was referable only to the alleqed oral lease.
Lloyd, 86 P. 767 (Utah 1906).

Price v.

The acts performed by BUFFO and/or

UTE-CAL - possession and periodic late payment of rent - are not
referable only to the alleged oral lease, but rather are entirely
consistent with a month-to-month tenancy existing between INTERMOUNTAIN and BUFFO and/or UTE-CAL.
Appellant BUFFO cites Adams v. Taylor, 391 P.2d 837
(Utah 1964) in support if its "part performance" argument.

In

Adams, tenants made extensive improvements, timely paid monthly
rent for two years in reliance upon an oral contract to lease
the premises for five yearsJ more importantly, tenants had a
memorandmn signed by the landlord evidencing their agreement.
There is no such written agreement in this case, and the trial
court expressly found that BUFFO had failed to prove any contract
other than a month-to-month tenancy.

(Trial Court's Findings of

Fact No. 11; R. 227; Conclusions of Law No. 2; R. 228-29).Consequently the "actions" by BUFFO, including late rent payments
made by UTE-CAL and BUFFO merely confirm the existence of a monthto-month tenancy rather than any lease.
2.

Esto·ppel.

Appellant BUFFO next argues that respondent

INTERMOUNTAIN is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds
as a defense.

(Appellant's Brief at 9).

Appellant BUFFO bases
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its estoppel argument on two allegations wholly unsupported by
evidence at trial.

The first unsupported assertion is that INTER-

MOUNTAIN represented "that it (UTE-CAL) would acquire the real
property lease • • • 11

(Appellant's Brief, Page 9) while the second

unsupported assertion is that INTERMOUNTAIN (through its President
Reo Cutler) told appellant BUFFO that it was "Okay to expend
the monies on the premises" (Appellant's Brief at Page 10).
These allegations, however, are contrary to the facts established
at trial and the Trial Court's Conclusion of Law No. 6 {R. 226):
that the improvements made by UTE-CAL and BUFFO "were made prior
to lease negotiations between INTERMOUNTAIN and BUFFO and/or
UTE-CAL and after INTERMOUNTAIN 1 s warning to BUFFO not to make
such improvements until a written lease agreement was entered
into by the parties." (R. 230-31).

The evidence supporting the

trial court's finding is Reo Cutler•· s testimony, as

President

of INTERMOUNTAIN, that he specifically warned PETE J. BUFFO not
to make improvements without a lease

{R. 337,358)

and the

improvements were made in June, 1978, while draft leases were
not exchanged until August, 1978.
This Court recently emphasised that the trial court
has the responsibility of determining disputed issues of fact
and in so doing, the fact finder will "necessarily accept the
testimony of certain witnesses, discounting conflicting testimony.
We do not. substitute our belief for theirs unless there is no
competent evidence to support the verdict."

Fillmore Pr·oducts

· v.· Weste·rn States Paving, 592 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1979).

The

trial court believed the testimony of Cutler and discoWlted the
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testimony of the felon PETE J. BUFFO.

Because there is competent

evidence to support this finding by the trial court, this court
should not substitute its assessment of transcript testimony for
the trial court's appraisal of these two witnesses' credibility.
Furthermore, even if INTERMOUNTAIN did promise to enter
into a lease with BUFFO or UTE-CAL, such an oral promise does
not estop INTERMOUNTAIN from interposing the statute of frauds
as a defense.

In Ravar'ino

'V.

p·rice, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953),

the Utah Supreme Court relied upon the long recognized rule laid
down by the United States Supreme Court in Union Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544 (1878) regarding estoppel
in the context of a promise to perform in the future:

"The only

case in which a representation as to the future can be held to
operate as an estoppel is where it relates to an intended abandonment of an existing riqht, and is made to influence others, and
by which they have been induced to act • • • • " (at 547).
In Ravarino, supra this Court provided an example of
such an abandonment of a legal right.

This Court cited Waugh

v. Lennard, 211 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1949), where the defendant induced
the plaintiff to refrain from commencing an action on a promissory
note by representing that he would not invoke the statute of
limitations as a bar.

In a subsequent action, the defenant did

attempt to raise the statute as a bar.
that he was estopped from doing so:

The Arizona court held

by his promise, the defendant

had manifested an intent to abandon an existing right.
Appellant BUFFO's Brief does not suggest that any existing
right was abandoned by INTERMOUNTAIN.

Instead, appellant BUFFO
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alleges, again without citation to any supporting evidence, that
INTERMOUNTAIN represented that a lease would be executed at
some time in the future (Appellant BUFFO's Brief, Page 9).

Not

only is such an allegation contrary to the evidence (Trial Court's
Conclusion of Law

~o.

6; R. 230, 337), it is insufficient under

the Ravarino test to estop INTERMOUNTAIN from asserting the
statute of frauds.
INTERMOUNTAIN made no such

pro~ase

which could func-

tion as an abandonment of an existing right (Trial Court's
Conclusion of Law No. 5; R. 229-30).

Any improvements to

the property were made in spite of the warnings by INTERMOUNTAIN's
President.
Appellant BUFFO's equitable estoppel argument is
further weakened by the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Easton

v. Wycoff, 295 P.2d 332 (Utah 1956).

In Easton, the Court

addressed the question of whether the reliance of the tenant
upon the promise of the landlord to execute the written lease
in the future would estop the landlord from asserting the
statute of frauds as a defense.

The Court applied the rule

set forth in Ravarino, supra, that a mere refusal to execute
a written contract as agreed, does not constitute fraud sufficient to remove the oral promise from the statute of frauds.
The court emphasized that:

"[The] mere promise to execute

a written contract, followed by refusal to do so, is not sufficient to create an estoppel, even though reliance is placed
on such promise and damages occasioned by such refusal." (at
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Ravarino and Easton hold that, even if INTERMOUNTAIN

promised to execute a lease with UTE-CAL (a promise which
the trial court concluded had never been made), such a promise
does not estop INTERMOUNTAIN from raising the statute of frauds
as

a defense.
3.

Wai·ver.

Appellant BUFFO' s final argument on

the statute of frauds issue alleges that respondent INTERMOUNTAIN
"Waived their right to execution of their lease."
Brief at 11).

(Appellant's

Appellant BUFFO's entire argument is based

upon an isolated case from a foreign jurisdiction.

In that

case, McKennon v. Anderson, 298 P.2d 492 (Wash. 1956), a tenant
made improvements after the parties had agreed upon the terms
of the lease.

The Washington Supreme Court held that since

a written contract existed, the lack of formalities did not
defeat the validity of that contract.

The landlord was not

allowed to assert the lack of formalities as a defense to
the existence of the lease.

McKennon is neither controlling

nor particularly persuasive:

unlike the tenant in McKennon,

UTE-CAL and BUFFO have failed to prove any underlying contract,
either formal or informal.

In McKennon, an offer and acceptance

of the terms had occurred.

Instead of a question of the com-

pliance with certain formalities of execution, in the instant
case, there is no evidence whatsoever of any agreement and the
trial court properly so found.
IV.

BUFFO AND UTE-CAL WERE VALIDLY SERVED UNDER
78-36-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
Appellant BUFFO

next attacks the trial court's
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his personal corporation, UTE-CAL, were duly and properly served
with the Notice to Quit on December 12, 1979 (Trial Court's
Findings of Fact No. 8; R. 231).
Section 78-36-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, governs
when a month-to-month tenant is in unlawful detainer.

Appellant

BUFFO seeks to avoid this statute by announcing that it was not
a month-to-month tenant:

"Since UTE-CAL is asserting a lease

with a definite period, it does not fall under 78-36-3(2)."
(Appellant's Brief at 12).

But this bald assertion was rejected

by the trial court and BUFFO does not cite in its Brief any

conflicting evidence admitted at trial.

(Trial Court's Finding

of Fact No. 13; R. 227-28; Trial Court's Conclusion of Law No.
7; R. 231).

The trial court found that the absence of a lease

between INTERMOUNTAIN and UTE-CAL and/or BUFFO established a
month-to-month tenancy.

(Findings of Fact No. 13; R. 227-8).

Therefore, 78-36-3(2) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, governs the
form of the Notice to Quit in the instant case.

Defendant's

Exhibit No. 20 - the December 11, 1979 Notice to Quit was in
the proper form to terminate the month-to-month tenancy.

(Findings

of Fact No. 16; R. 228).

j:

f1

Appellant BUFFO next argues that service of the Notice
to Quit was inadequate.

(Appellant's Brief at 11) for failure

to comply with Section 78-36-6.

The Court should reject this

argument as appellant BUFFO in his January 22, 1980 Answer to
Defendant's (INTERMOUNTAIN) Counterclaim at paragraph 10 (R.
49-50) "admit(s) service."

At trial counsel for BUFFO sought
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I:

to avoid that admission (R. 403-05) but did not move to amend
the answer and the trial court found that on "December 12, 1979,
Exchange_Associates caused a Notice to Quit to be served upon
UTE-CAL and BUFFO, which Notice required UTE-CAL and BUFFO to
quit the premises on or before the last day of December, 1979."
(R.

228).
In addition, appellant BUFFO at trial stipulated,

through his counsel that the Constable "served a copy of this
notice • • • in accordance with his affidavit."

(R.f103-04).

Defendant's Exhibit 20 is the Constable's Affidavit of Service
and he swears that on December 12, 1979, he •posted on door
and mailed a copy to each at the usual place of business.of said
defendants."
Therefore, Section 78-36-6 was precisely complied
with as to both UTE-CAL and BUFFO since copies of the Notice
to Quit were posted on the door ·and mailed.

Perkins v. Spencer,

243 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah 1952).
Appellant BUFFO next argues that Rule 4 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procecure overrides the specific service requirements of Section 78-36-6.

Appellant BUFFO neither cites any

authority for this proposition nor offers any particularly good
reason why the carefully drafted unlawful detainer statute
service provisions should be modified by a cross-reference to
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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V.

THE AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE LOWER COURT SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED

A.

Judge Sawaya· Prop·e·rlt Aw-a·rd·ea 'l'"rebTe n·a.ma·g·e·s· ·1n
· This· un1·awu:l Detaine·r Action
Section 78-36-10, Utah Code Annotated, provides for

treble damages in unlawful detainer actions.

Appellant BUFFO

now seeks to overturn the trial court's award of treble damages.
This Court's decisions establish that treble damages
should be awarded in unlawful detainer actions.

In Forrester v.

Cook, 292 P. 206 (Utah 1930), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"The statute [i.e. an earlier statute which provides as does
78-36-10, that if the court assessed damages occasioned to the
plaintiff by any unlawful detainer, the judgment should be rendered
against defendant for three times the amount of damages assessed]
makes it mandatory upon the court to render judgment for
three times the amount of damages thus assessed." (at 214).
Appellant BUFFO relies on Price Construction Co.
V. Foutz, __ P.2d __ (Utah Supreme Court, May 30, 1980)
{No. 16688), a recent case in which the Utah Supreme Court did
not award treble damages in an unlawful detainer action.

In

a very brief opinion, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a trial
court's decision in which treble damages were not awarded.
However, it is not established that the plaintiff in Price
even sought treble damages at the trial level.

Section 78-36-10

is not even mentioned in the opinion and this Court did not
address the issue of treble damages.

It would be difficult

to conclude that this Court in ·Price did intend to overturn
the well-established Utah rule regarding treble damages in
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unlawful detainer actions since the Court annoWlced that "this
opinion does not add significantly to existing law and hence
is not to be published • • • • "

Whether an Wlpublished opinion

should even be cited as authority overruling an unchallenged
fifty-year old rule is unclear at best.
B.

BUFFO is Personally Liable.
In its Brief, plaintiff/appellant declares that

"third-party defendant/appellant seeks to be declared not
personally responsible for damages.

(Third-party defendant/

appellant was not explicitly found personally liable and argues
that he is not)."

(Appellant BUFFO's Brief at 2).

BUFFO ignores the express conclusion of the trial
court finding him personally liable.

In Conclusion of Law No.

9, Judge Sawaya explicitly found that "treble damages shall
be three times

$936

per month • • • for each month or a portion

thereof which BUFFO and/or UTE-CAL unlawfully detained the
premises known as the Exchange Club.

Furthermore, BUFFO and/or

UTE-CAL are also liable £or rent for the months of April, 1979,
and December, 1979 • • • • "

(R. 231)

Similarly the Judgment

(Unlawful Detainer) also expressly provides that "defendants
and third-party plaintiffs (INTERMOUNTAIN) have and recover
from plaintiff (UTE-CAL) and the third-party defendant (PETE
J. BUFFO) jointly and severally, the sum of $13,688.00, which
includes treble damages • • • • "

(R. 233-34).
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. CONCLUSTON
Judge Sawaya correctly determined that BUFFO and/or
UTE-CAL could not have acquired a valid assignment of the
tenninated INVESTESTATE lease.

BUFFO also failed to establish

any new lease agreement between UTE-CAL and/or BUFFO and
INTERMOUNTAIN.

Since the Notice to Quit was properly served

upon UTE-CAL and BUFFO on December 12, 1979, both UTE-CAL and
BUFFO remained in unlawful detainer of the premises after
December 31, 1979.

Hence, felon PETE J. BUFFO was properly

determined to be personally liable for treble damages.
The Unlawful Detainer Judgment, supported by detailed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law after two days of trial
before Judge Sawaya, should be affirmed.
DATED this

!~day

of October, 1980.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

BY:
Gordon Strachan
Attorneys for Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs
INTERMOUNTAIN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a copy
of the foreqoing Brief of Respondents Intermountain Stock
Exchange and Exchange Associates to Robert M. McRae and Loni F.
DeLand, McRae and DeLand, 72 East 400 South, 1355, Salt Lake
City, Utah

~·
84111 this "2__ day of October, 1980.
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